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The Assumptions Underlying the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and 
their Implications. 
Abstract
Since 1999 international actors have presented Kosovo’s problems as stemming 
exclusively from endogenous factors which locals cannot solve; international 
oversight is thus a necessary and benign source of order. The KSC is the latest 
initiative premised on this assumption; this article identifies the key implications 
of this. The fact that the KSC’s creation was driven by external actors has had a 
negative impact on its legitimacy amongst the general public within Kosovo that 
will impact on their response to its proceedings. The idea that international 
oversight is more efficient is questionable given that since 1999 international 
judicial mechanisms have endured corruption, witness intimidation, and political 
interference. Those who supported the establishment of the KSC advanced a 
narrative which implies they were not culpable for the events of 1998-2000; in 
fact, both UNMIK and KFOR – by virtue of their respective mandates – 
manifestly failed in their duty to provide security. 
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Introduction
The creation of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) in 2015 was regarded by some as 
evidence of a new appetite for international tribunals, specifically so-called “hybrid” 
tribunals. While a number of international tribunals – of varying composition – were 
established in the 1990s amidst great optimism, the record of many has been decidedly 
mixed. Concerns about the efficacy of such tribunals, as well as their cost and impact on 
peace and stability, led to a sense of ‘tribunal fatigue’.1 Thus, for those committed to the 
expansion of international criminal justice and the basic ideas underpinning both universal 
jurisdiction and transitional justice, the creation of the KSC appeared as something of a 
1 Carsten Stahn, ‘Tribunals are Dead, Long Live Tribunals: MICT, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and the 
Turn to New Hybridity’, EJIL Talk, 23 September, 2016, https://www.ejiltalk.org/tribunals-are-dead-long-live-
tribunals-mict-the-kosovo-specialist-chambers-and-the-turn-to-new-hybridity/, accessed 9 February 2019.
welcome counter to the general diminution in support for, and institutional developments in, 
international tribunals.  
In this article, however, I argue that the creation of the KSC and its particular 
composition, has less to do with a renewed faith in the efficacy of tribunals, and more to do 
with the particular nature of international engagement with Kosovo since 1999. I argue that 
the KSC is the latest initiative – launched by external actors engaged with Kosovo – premised 
on a particular understanding of the relationship between international and local actors. This 
understanding is based on an assumption – both explicit and at times implicit – which holds 
that international engagement is necessary, benign and ultimately a source of both order and 
prosperity. The international actors – in their various guises since 1999 – have repeatedly 
presented themselves as custodians of the “solution” to problems within Kosovo; these 
problems are themselves conceptualised as stemming exclusively from endogenous factors 
which local actors – if left to their own devices – cannot solve. The international engagement 
is thus presented and legitimised as inherently efficacious and progressive, whereas the local 
institutions and actors are cast as flawed, incapable of self-correction, and ultimately in need 
of external support. 
In the first two sections of this article, I demonstrate the nature of this underlying 
premise, how it has manifest in Kosovo since the creation of UNMIK in 1999, and how it 
informed the composition of the KSC. There are, I argue in the subsequent section, three 
problems with this; first, the creation of the KSC was driven by external – rather than local 
actors – and this has had a negative impact on the KSC’s legitimacy amongst the general 
public within Kosovo. In the absence of local legitimacy, the KSC’s proceedings and 
judgements are unlikely to command domestic support, thereby imperilling the broader aims 
set for the KSC by its international sponsors. Second, the idea that international oversight is 
inherently more efficient is questionable; international engagement with Kosovo since 1999 
demonstrates that international judicial mechanisms have become embroiled in corruption, 
fallen prey to witness intimidation, and political interference. Third, those who pushed for the 
establishment of the KSC have advanced a narrative of the events under the court’s 
jurisdiction which implies that they were not themselves involved in these events; in fact, I 
argue that both UNMIK and KFOR – by virtue of their respective mandates – manifestly 
failed in their duty to provide security for the people of Kosovo, especially ethnic minorities. 
Additionally, evidence suggests that international actors actively supported certain KLA 
operatives during this phase in an effort to garner their support for maintaining “order” in 
Kosovo. The idea, therefore, that the internationals can present themselves as the 
disinterested “solution” to a problem for which locals are wholly responsible is flawed.
International Engagement with Kosovo 
One of the more persistent historical tropes about the Balkans is that it is a region populated by 
violent people; plagued by “ancient ethnic hatreds” its inhabitants are – so this depiction goes – 
doomed to live in a state of constant enmity punctuated by the periodic outbreak of war.2 The 
only hope for these ostensibly “backward” people rests, according to this view, on intervention 
by external powers who will thereafter impose order on the restive natives. Throughout history, 
many empires – be they the Roman, Byzantine, Russian, Ottoman, or Austro-Hungarian – have 
legitimised their subjugation of Balkan territory in this way, and portrayed their governance as 
evidence of their own moral rectitude and capacity to spearhead progress; as Vesna 
Goldsworthy notes in Inventing Ruritania – a detailed historical analysis of the external image 
of the Balkans – the region has long been conceived of by foreigners as ‘…a dolls house into 
2 Misha Glenny, The Balkans (London: Granta, 2000), p. xxi.
which “grown-up” powers can reach to show the natives how to behave and where to place the 
furniture’.3
In a modern rendering of this conception, many attributed the implosion of 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s to the prevalence of these “ancient ethnic hatreds”.4 Indicatively, 
former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia George Kennan claimed that the people there were 
impelled by ‘deeper traits of character inherited, presumably, from a distant tribal past’.5 US 
President Bill Clinton, reflecting on the violence, likewise claimed, ‘It is no accident that 
WWI started in this area. There are ancient ethnic hatreds that have consumed people and led 
to the horrible abuses’.6 Of course, the often horrific violence in many parts of the former 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s very definitely did manifest along ethnic lines; yet, rather than 
examine the factors – endogenous and exogenous – which led to the breakdown of pre-
existing political communities and the manifestation of conflict along ethnic lines, many 
chose the more essentialist view described above, and attributed the violence to localised, and 
ostensibly immutable, character traits.7
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in March 1999 was likewise justified in terms which 
evoked the spectre of what President Clinton then described as ‘Ancient grievances’ 
producing ‘ethnic and religious division’.8 By definition, launching a “humanitarian 
intervention” denotes a belief in the necessity of external intervention to redress unacceptable 
local behaviour. While the idea of humanitarian intervention is thus for many an inherently 
“colonial” undertaking9, NATO’s intervention received widespread support in the West, and 
3 Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination (London, Hurst & Co., 2013), p. 
11.
4 See in particular, Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts (New York: St Martins, 1993).
5 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 185.
6 Quoted in, Alex Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 50.
7 Mark Mazower, The Balkans, (London: Phoenix, 2000) pp. 14 – 15.
8 CNN, ‘Transcript: Clinton addresses nation on Yugoslavia strike’, March 24, 1999, 
http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/25/clinton.transcript/, accessed 9 February 2019.
9 See, Mohammed Ayoob ‘Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty’, 6(1), The International Journal of 
Human Rights, (2002) p. 85; Phillip Cunliffe (ed.) Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect 
(London, Routledge, 2011).
was enthusiastically welcomed by the Kosovo Albanian population. In this sense, while the 
intervention was, by definition, the projection of power by external actors, and also illegal – 
insofar as it lacked Security Council authorisation – it was widely deemed to be legitimate 
owing both to the fact that the Albanian population of Kosovo had long suffered systematic 
oppression at the hands of Slobodan Milošević’s regime, and the majority of people in 
Kosovo supported NATO’s actions.10
Immediately after the conclusion of NATO’s intervention, Kosovo was placed under 
international administration; Security Council Resolution 1244 mandated the establishment 
of UNMIK then the most ambitious post-conflict reconstruction project ever launched by the 
UN11; described at the time by Amnesty International as ‘overwhelming in its magnitude’12 
UNMIK’s powers were ‘virtually unlimited’13 and Kosovo was placed under its de facto 
authority. While domestic political institutions were established, their powers were very 
limited and the composition of these bodies – whether political or judicial – was micro-
managed by UNMIK, and the externally drafted constitutions to which they were bound.14 
The extensive, and historically unprecedented powers vested in UNMIK, were 
justified on the basis that Kosovo could not function without far-reaching international 
oversight; given that Kosovo had historically been the most neglected region of the former 
Yugoslavia, and since 1989 – when its autonomous status was revoked by Milošević – had 
been subjected to wilful misrule and targeted oppression from Belgrade culminating in the 
devastating war between 1998 and 1999, there was clearly some logic to the proposition that 
Kosovo needed extensive external help. Yet, though the Kosovo Albanians warmly 
10 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
p. 4.
11 UNMIK, ‘UNMIK at a Glance’, http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm, accessed 9 February 2019.
12 Amnesty International, ‘FRY (Kosovo): Setting the Standard UNMIK and KFOR’S Response to Violence in 
Mitrovica’, 13 March 2000, P. 4.
13 Julie Mertus, ‘The Impact of Intervention on Local Human Rights Culture: A Kosovo Case Study’, in 
Anthony Lang, (ed.) Just Intervention, (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002), p.162.
14 Lene Mosegaard Sobjerg, ‘The Kosovo Experiment’, in Tonny Brems Knudsen and Carsten Bagge Laustsen 
(eds.), Kosovo Between War and Peace, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 67.
welcomed the international administrators in the summer of 1999, frustration with the power 
wielded by UNMIK soon grew. Rather than being seen as an entity designed to facilitate their 
quest for independence, UNMIK became, for many Kosovo Albanians, ‘corrupt and 
indecisive’ and a barrier to achieving independence.15 A 2002 report by the Ombudsperson 
Institution in Kosovo noted, ‘UNMIK is not structured according to democratic principles, 
does not function in accordance with the rule of law, and does not respect important 
international human rights norms’.16 Anger at UNMIK’s lack of accountability, complete 
control over Kosovo’s political, economic and judicial sectors, and unwillingness to address 
the issue of Kosovo’s final status, boiled over in March 2004 when province-wide riots –
orchestrated by disgruntled Kosovo Albanians – erupted. 
Thereafter, the West’s approach towards Kosovo changed and greater emphasis was 
placed on facilitating Kosovo’s independence. Despite the objections of Serbia, and Security 
Council permanent members Russia and China, Kosovo was encouraged to unilaterally 
declare independence in February 2008. While Kosovo thus nominally became an 
independent state – though international recognition of Kosovo was then, and remains, a 
deeply divisive issue17 – external governance continued. An International Civilian Office was 
established to maintain international oversight with extensive powers to directly intervene in 
Kosovo’s political system.18 EULEX was also created in 2008 to assist the Kosovo 
authorities in ‘establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions’.19 Likewise, 
Kosovo’s 2008 constitution was drafted by internationals who insisted on an array of 
15 International Commission on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe’s Future, 2005, http://www.balkan-
commission.org/activities/Report.pdf, pgs. 19 & 20, accessed 9 February 2019; see also, Laura Secor, ‘The UN 
Has Brought Peace and Stability to Kosovo’, Global Policy Forum, 6 July, 2003, 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/192/38666.html, accessed 9 February 2019.
16 Quoted in Simon Chesterman, You the People: The United Nations, Transnational Administration and State-
building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 126.
17 Gezim Visoka, Acting Like a State? Kosovo and the Everyday Making of Statehood, (London: Routledge, 
2018).
18 Peter Feith, State Building and Exit: The International Civilian Office and Kosovo's Supervised Independence 
2008-2012, (Pristina: International Civilian Office, 2013).
19 EULEX, ‘About EULEX: The Mission’, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,60, accessed 9 February 2019.
provisions – especially in the area of minority rights and representation – which had 
negligible domestic support.20  External micro-management extended to the design of 
Kosovo’s flag and its national anthem, while persistent interference in Kosovo’s political 
system continued, most notably with respects to the designation of Kosovo’s President in 
2011.21 
Thus, since NATO’s intervention in March 1999, international engagement with 
Kosovo has been characterised by the implementation of a set of highly invasive policies and 
initiatives; the array of international organisations that have exercised formal control over 
Kosovo since 1999 – including UNMIK, the OSCE, NATO, ICO and EULEX – is clearly 
extensive. In addition to the formal means by which international governance has manifest, a 
number of powerful states have regularly exercised leverage in Kosovo in less formal ways. 
The US Ambassador in Pristina has routinely engaged directly in Kosovo’s political system, 
while the EU – which Kosovo’s people and all major political parties desperately seek to join 
– has likewise pushed the government of Kosovo to adopt various policies internally and 
externally. This degree of international control has, indeed, generated myriad academic 
reflections on the side-lining of the “local” in the process of statebuilding22, and within 
Kosovo itself, catalysed the emergence of Vetëvendosje a political party opposed to 
international oversight, which became the largest party in the Kosovo Assembly after the 
2017 general election. 
20 Marc Weller, Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 258.
21 Erjone Popova and Bekim Muhaxheri (2016) ‘The President Who Did Not Strike Back’ Prishtina Insight, 7 
April, https://prishtinainsight.com/president-not-strike-back-mag/, accessed 9 February 2019; Aidan Hehir, 
‘How the West Built a Failed State in Kosovo’, The National Interest, 21 August, 2016, 
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-west-built-failed-state-kosovo-17539, accessed 9 February 2019.
22 Nicholas Lemay-Hebert, ‘The Empty Shell Approach: The set-up process of international administrations in 
Timor-leste and Kosovo, its consequences and lessons’, 12(2), International Studies Perspectives, (2011), pp. 
190-211; Elisa Randazzo, Beyond Liberal Peacebuilding: A Critical Exploration of the Local Turn, (London: 
Routledge, 2017); Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Where is the Local? Critical Localism and Peacebuilding’, 36(5) Third 
World Quarterly, (2015), 840-856.
In reflecting on why international actors have taken such an interest in Kosovo, the 
obvious starting point is to determine whether there are material interests involved; as a 
landlocked country of just 1.7 million people – where a majority of workers are unskilled – 
with very limited national resources, Kosovo does not stand out as especially valuable. Yet, 
Kosovo’s importance extends beyond the material to the reputational; the West has invested 
significant political capital in Kosovo and thus its fate has implications for Western 
prestige.23 In this sense, a return to ethnic violence in Kosovo would naturally be widely seen 
as evidence that the West’s statebuilding efforts “failed”. In an era when ‘the ability of 
outside powers to provide governance and control the internal behaviour of failed or weak 
states has become a key component of their national power’24, the importance of Kosovo thus 
arguably overweighed any tangible domestic resources.25 
Since 1999, therefore, Kosovo’s fate has been linked to Western prestige; this has led 
to a determination amongst Kosovo’s external patrons to ensure that order – narrowly 
understood – is preserved. The “order” sought has essentially been conceived of as the 
absence of ethnic violence, and the maintenance of peaceful relations between Kosovo and its 
neighbours. Since the 2004 riots both have arguably been achieved; while Kosovo’s 
communities remain segregated – as most obviously manifest in the literal division of the 
northern city Mitrovica into “Serbian” and “Albanian” areas – there has only been sporadic 
incidents of low-level ethnic violence. Likewise, while relations between Kosovo and its 
neighbours – especially Serbia – remain poor, there has been no significant destabilising 
incidents. Given that following NATO’s intervention many feared Albanian minorities in 
23 Aidan Hehir ‘Hyper-reality and Statebuilding: Baudrillard and the Unwillingness of International 
Administrations to Cede Control’, 32(6) Third Wold Quarterly, (2011), pp. 1073-1087.
24 Francis Fukuyama (2006) ‘Nation-building and the Failure of International Memory’, in Francis Fukuyama 
(ed.) Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (New York: John Hopkins University Press), p. 2.
25 Further reflections on how “great powers” consolidate and improve their international status through 
cultivating a network of states dependant on their patronage/informal authority, see,  William Bain (ed) (2006) 
The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People (London: Routledge); David Chandler (2006) Empire in 
Denial (London: Pluto); Ralphe Wilde (2007) ‘Colionialism Redux?’, in Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson (ed.s) 
Statebuilding: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge)
neighbouring Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, would agitate for secession along the lines 
of the “Kosovo precedent”, the maintenance of regional stability was far from assured when 
statebuilding began in Kosovo. As such, while ethnic segregation, unemployment, corruption, 
poor healthcare and a failing education system have been perennial features of Kosovo’s 
evolution post-1999, these internal issues have been cast as of lesser importance when 
compared to the maintenance of order.  This preference for regional order/stability over the 
material well-being of people – a policy described as ‘stabilitocrisy’26 – has, indeed, been a 
feature of international engagement with the former Yugoslav states more generally. Indeed, 
as the west’s power has waned considerably since 1999, its capacity to undertake expansive 
transformative statebuilding projects has diminished. In this respects, the need for stability 
rather than progress transformation has become more pressing as western states have 
increasingly lowered their expectations as to what statebuilding can achieve, and also their 
own capacity to undertake such exercises.27 
Thus, the West’s engagement with Kosovo since 1999 can arguably be situated within 
a more general trend in international involvement with the Balkans whereby external actors 
cast themselves as benign, civilised saviours bringing order to unruly people incapable of 
self-rule. In practical terms, this has manifest in the creation of an array of international 
mechanisms empowered with formal administrative and governance competencies in Kosovo 
justified on the basis that, left to their own devices, the people of Kosovo would regress to 
violence. The impetus for this engagement with Kosovo has stemmed from the importance of 
Kosovo as a symbol of Western power, with its fate being illustrative of the capacity of the 
West to undertake benevolent, transformative projects. Central to these narratives and these 
26 Srda Pavlovic, ‘West is best: How ‘stabilitocracy’ undermines democracy building in the Balkans’, LSE Blog 
on South-east Europe, 5 May, 2017, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/05/05/west-is-best-how-
stabilitocracy-undermines-democracy-building-in-the-balkans/, accessed 9 February 2019.; Florian Bieber ‘The 
Rise (and Fall) of Balkan Stabilitocracies’, Horizons, 10, (2018), accessed 9 February 2019.  
27 Oliver Richmond (2014) Failed Statebuilding (Yale: Yale University Press)
policies, of course, is the stark binary between the external actors and the behaviour of the 
locals; in this sense, the “problems” in Kosovo are characterised as wholly endogenous, while 
their resolution is portrayed as possible only through the intervention of external forces who 
are ostensibly both impelled by benign motives and in no way implicated in the genesis of the 
underlying problems they are charged with resolving. In the following section I argue that the 
KSC is the latest manifestation of this disposition. 
Creating the KSC
The origins and composition of the KSC is documented in other articles in this special issue 
and I will not detail them again here. Of particular relevance to this article, however, is the 
fact that the court, though nominally a Kosovo court based on Kosovo’s constitution, has 
been designed to negate local control and oversight in favour of delegating power to 
international actors. The KSC is a “hybrid”28 court in so far as – unlike the ICTY – it is 
technically not an international tribunal, but rather one established within the Kosovo 
constitution, though it is staffed exclusively by non-Kosovars and located in The Hague. In 
this sense, this nominally national judicial mechanism is controlled by external actors. 
The rationale underlying the nature of the court stems from the sense that the pre-
existing judicial mechanism within Kosovo would have been unable to deal effectively with 
investigations into the events under review; according to Ekaterina Trendafilova, President of 
the KSC, the international dimension of the court ensures the proceedings will be ‘conducted 
in a more efficient manner’.29 The court’s location and composition were thus designed to 
guard against those factors – such as political interference, witness intimidation, and a dearth 
28 Carsten Stahn, ‘Tribunals are Dead, Long Live Tribunals: MICT, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and the 
Turn to New Hybridity’.
29 Centrum pro lidska prave a demokratizaci, ‘Interview with the President of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers 
in The Hague, Ekaterina Trendafilova: The Court is Ready for its First Indictments’, 18 January, 2019, 
http://www.centrumlidskaprava.cz/interview-president-kosovo-specialist-chambers-hague-ekaterina-
trendafilova-court-ready-its-first-in, accessed 9 February 2019.
of local judicial expertise – that would, ostensibly, have inevitably impacted adversely on the 
investigations and trials.30  
The establishment of the court was characterised by a clash between the wishes of 
external actors and those of the political parties and general public within Kosovo. While the 
findings of the Council of Europe’s 2011 report31 were widely dismissed by most of the 
Kosovo Albanian community as either baseless and/or a wild exaggeration – particularly the 
organ harvesting allegations – the later findings published by the Special Investigative Task 
Force (SITF)32 were, however, less easily dismissed given the standing of its chief 
investigator Clint Williamson.33 Yet, despite the SITF’s findings and recommendations, few 
within Kosovo supported the establishment of a new court; objections ranged from the fact 
that many believed a focus solely on the activities of the KLA in this period was unfair, to the 
view that these issues had been – or could be – dealt with by pre-existing judicial bodies 
based in Kosovo.34 Many civil society activists, journalists and NGOs did support the 
establishment of the court, however, and more broadly the move was welcomed by 
organisations throughout the former Yugoslavia working on transitional justice, reparations 
and reconciliation.35 
30 A similar rationale was advanced for the location – and composition – of the ICTY and the ICC; see, Phil 
Clark (2018) Distant Justice: The Impact of the International Criminal Court on African Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press); Jelena Subotic (2009) Hijacked Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)
31 Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit 
Trafficking of Human Organs in Kosovo’, Report No. 12462, 7 January 2011, 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=12608&lang=en, accessed 9 February 
2019.
32 Special Investigative Task Force, ‘Statement of the Chief Prosecutor of the Special Investigative Task Force’, 
29 July, 2014, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/file/show/Statement_of_the_Chief_Prosecutor_of_the_SITF_EN.pdf, 
accessed 9 February 2019.
33 Clint Williamson previously served as an ICTY trial attorney and took part into the investigation of crimes 
perpetrated by Slobodon Milošević and Serbian paramilitary groups.
34 See, Gezim Visoka, ‘Assessing the Potential Impact of the Kosovo Specialist Court’, Impunity Watch/PAX, 
September, 2017, https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-publications/assessing-the-potential-impact-of-
the-kosovo-specialist-court, p. 27, accessed 9 February 2019; Aidan Hehir, ‘Kosovo Specialist Chambers: Step 
Towards Justice or Potential Timebomb?’, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, 13 July, 2018, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/file/show/Step%20Towards%20Justice%20or%20Potential%20Timebomb.pd
f, accessed 9 February 2019.
35 For example, the Humanitarian Law Centre in Pristina has spoken of the need for the court; see, Aidan Hehir, 
‘It’s a good thing that we don’t know”: An Interview with Bekim Blakaj’, Justice in Conflict, September 11, 
The impetus for the court was driven, therefore, not by any domestic initiative but by 
a number of Kosovo’s more influential external patrons, particularly the US and the EU. The 
court could only be established, however, through an amendment to Kosovo’s constitution 
and this required the consent of the Kosovo Assembly; a majority of Assembly members 
were, however, implacably opposed to the creation of the court and thus attempts to amend 
the constitution initially failed. Large street protests against the court accompanied the 
debates in parliament, and there was evidently little public support for the constitutional 
change.36  
Yet, sustained international pressure was brought to bear on Kosovo and eventually 
the Assembly acceded. Many in the Assembly who supported the establishment of the court, 
however, noted that they did so only because of the leverage exercised by external actors; the 
then Prime Minister Hashim Thaci argued in favour of the creation of the court in the 
Assembly, yet simultaneously described it as ‘the biggest injustice and insult which could be 
done to Kosovo and its people’.37 Thaci subsequently declared he only supported the court 
because he was ‘under great pressure from the international community’.38 Since its 
establishment, the KSC has – despite launching a concerted outreach campaign39 – failed to 
garner significant support within Kosovo; none of the major political parties have 
campaigned meaningfully in support of the court, while a 2017 poll found that 76.4 per cent 
2017, https://justiceinconflict.org/2017/09/11/it-is-a-good-thing-that-we-dont-know-an-interview-with-bekim-
blakaj-on-the-travails-of-transitional-justice-in-kosovo/ accessed 6 September 2019
36 Marija Ristic, ‘Kosovo’s New War Court: How Will it Work?’, Balkan Transitional Justice, 4 August, 2015, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/how-will-special-kosovo-court-work--08-05-2015, accessed 9 February 
2019.
37 Edona Peci, ‘An End to Suspicions About Kosovo’s “Just War”?’, Balkan Transitional Justice, 13 August, 
2014, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/an-end-to-suspicions-about-kosovo-s-just-war, accessed 9 
February 2019.
38 B92, ‘Special Court for KLA “cannot be abolished” – Thaci’, 1 February, 2018, 
https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2018&mm=02&dd=01&nav_id=103403, accessed 9 February 
2019.
39 Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutors Office, ‘Outreach’, 2019, https://www.scp-
ks.org/en/outreach, accessed 9 February 2019.
of ethnic Albanians within Kosovo believed the court was ‘unfair’.40 Following the 2017 
general election a “war-wing” coalition of political parties formed a new government in 
Kosovo; these parties – the PDK, AAK, and NISMA – all have very close links with the 
KLA and thus unsurprisingly they have not leant government support to bolstering the 
perceived legitimacy of the KSC amongst the public in Kosovo. In December 2017, a group 
of MPS from within the coalition attempted to formally revoke the KSC in the Assembly. 
The initiative met with immediate condemnation from external actors; the US Ambassador to 
Kosovo warned the court’s revocation, ‘will have profoundly negative implications for 
Kosovo’s future as part of Europe. It will be considered by the United States as a stab in the 
back’.41 The UK Ambassador to Kosovo likewise stated that the move would ‘have grave 
consequences for Kosovo’.42 while, “the Quint”43 later released a statement declaring that 
anyone who supported the initiative to revoke the KSC, ‘…will be rejecting Kosovo’s 
partnership with our countries’ and warned there would be ‘severe negative consequences, 
including for Kosovo’s international and Euro-Atlantic integration, if Kosovo continues on 
this path’.44
The KSC was, therefore, created because of external pressure, rather than domestic 
support, and has been sustained through the continued leveraging of this pressure and the 
articulation of threats. As Bekim Blakaj – Director of the Humanitarian Law Centre Kosovo 
– noted, 
The Specialist Chambers are not supported by most of the Albanian community 
because they consider it to be biased and unfair…It’s not just the general public 
either; many lawyers, politicians, and academics have spoken against it, 
particularly about how it was established, and they have spread speculation and 
40 Gezim Visoka, ‘Assessing the Potential Impact of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers’, p. 27.
41 Erjone Popova, ‘Kosovo Assembly Fails to Convene for Vote on Revocation of “Special Court”’, Prishtina 
Insight, 22 December, 2017, https://prishtinainsight.com/kosovo-assembly-fails-convene-vote-revocation-
special-court/, accessed 9 February 2019.
42 Ibid.
43 The Quint states are France, Germany, Italy, UK and USA.
44 US Embassy in Kosovo, ‘Quint Member States Statement’, 4 January 2018, https://xk.usembassy.gov/quint-
member-states-statement/, accessed 9 February 2019.
rumours. Of course, we all know that the court could not have been established if 
it was not for the pressure exercised by the US on the Kosovo parliament.45
Thus, while the states exercising the pressure on Kosovo to establish and maintain the court 
officially consider Kosovo to be an independent sovereign state, their actions and rhetoric 
demonstrate that they do not accept that Kosovo can or should in fact exercise independence 
in certain key areas. Thus, Kosovo had to establish the KSC and had to do so in a particular 
way, namely by delegating all power within the judicial body to external actors. 
The means by which the KSC was established in the absence of domestic support, and 
the fact that it is constituted in such a way that local ownership is severely curtailed, contrast 
sharply with the normative prescriptions advanced by academics and international institutions 
on how international tribunals and transitional justice mechanisms should originate which 
stress the need for local support and ownership.46  The EU, indicatively, advises that any such 
mechanism can, ‘only reach its goals if the process of its design and implementation is 
nationally and locally-owned…It is essential that the process is initiated and driven by 
government authorities and local civil society.47 Despite the fact that the KSC clearly does 
not meet these goals, the EU strongly pushed for the establishment of the KSC and agreed to 
finance it.48 
45 Aidan Hehir, ‘It’s a good thing that we don’t know”: An Interview with Bekim Blakaj’, Justice in Conflict, 
September 11, 2017, https://justiceinconflict.org/2017/09/11/it-is-a-good-thing-that-we-dont-know-an-
interview-with-bekim-blakaj-on-the-travails-of-transitional-justice-in-kosovo/ accessed 6 September 2019.
46 Dustin Sharp, ‘Transitional Justice and Local Justice’, in Research Handbook on Transitional Justice (eds.) 
Cheryl Lawther, Luke Moffett and Dov Jacobs (Cheltenham: EE Elgar, 2017), p. 412; Kofi Annan, ‘The rule of 
law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: Report of the Secretary-General’, 
(S/2004/616), 23 August,  2004, p. 3, http://archive.ipu.org/splz-e/unga07/law.pdf, accessed 9 February 2019; 
Eric Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, ‘A World unto Itself? The Application of Criminal Justice in the 
Former Yugoslavia’, in My Neighbour, My Enemy, (eds.) Eric Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 32-33.
47 EU, ‘The EU’s Policy Framework on Support to Transitional Justice’, 16 November, 2015, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/the_eus_policy_framework_on_support_to_transitional_justi
ce.pdf, p. 8, accessed 9 February 2019.
48 The amount earmarked by the EU to support the KSC until June 2020 is €86,250,000; see, Serbeze Haxhial,  
‘Kosovo Hires US, UK Law Firms for Hague War Court Cases’, Balkan Transitional Justice, 7 February, 2019, 
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/02/07/kosovo-hires-us-uk-law-firms-for-hague-war-court-cases/, accessed 9 
February 2019.
Is “International” Always Better?
The means by which the KSC was established, and its hybrid composition, highlight the 
prevalence of the view that the solution to Kosovo’s problems must come from international 
rather than domestic actors. There are, I argue, three problems with this view, each of which 
are dealt with in turn here. 
Can the KSC Work Without Local Support?
The need for local ownership and support – widely noted in the relevant literature – is more 
than a cosmetic exercise. Central to the long-term efficacy of any judicial body like the KSC 
is its legitimacy amongst the host population. Such a court can, of course, issue judgements 
without local legitimacy once it has been established, but the impact of these judgements – in 
terms of the broader societal acceptance that those convicted were indeed guilty – will 
naturally be adversely affected. 
In the specific case of the KSC, those who argued in favour of the creation of the 
court routinely argued that it would do more than just determine criminal guilt; the court was 
presented as a means by which Kosovo could achieve reconciliation and ultimately move on 
from its dark past towards a better future. Indicatively, a joint statement by the US and EU 
supporting the establishment of the KSC noted, ‘By dealing with its past and ensuring justice 
for the victims, Kosovo can achieve reconciliation and build a better future’.49 Yet, while few 
deny that criminal proceedings such as those proposed by the KSC can aid transitional justice 
and as such facilitate reconciliation, or that Kosovo remains prey to the legacy of its violent 
past, judicial judgements passed down by bodies that lack popular legitimacy cannot 
reasonably hope to catalyse a wholesale sea-change in a society’s attitude.  
49 US Embassy in Kosovo, ‘Statement of EU Embassies/Offices, EUSR/EU Office and US Embassy in Kosovo 
on the adoption of constitutional amendment and law on the establishment of the Specialist Chambers’, 3 
August, 2015, https://xk.usembassy.gov/joint-statement/, accessed 9 February 2019.
The impact of the ICTY is illustrative here; despite the assurances offered by many of 
its more vocal proponents50, the judgements issued by the ICTY since its establishment in 
1993 neither catalysed a region-wide acknowledgment by the various national groups that 
wrongs were committed against others in their name, nor improved relations between those 
groups involved in the bloody wars that accompanied the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. 
This stems from the fact that the ICTY was invariably portrayed by those subject to its 
judgement as an illegitimate “alien” court biased against their particular national group. In 
many cases, those tried at, and even convicted by, the ICTY actually saw their popularity rise 
among their national cohort. Likewise, the judgements issued by the ICTY – however 
meticulously investigated and robust – have manifestly failed to convince people in the 
former Yugoslavia that the particular hyper-nationalist narrative they have been presented 
with by their leaders was in fact false.51 By way of illustration, a 2017 public opinion survey 
in Serbia found, ‘overwhelming public distrust in the ICTY and its findings’, noting, ‘those 
convicted by the “anti-Serb” ICTY are not guilty in the public’s view’. As a result of the 
ICTY’s perceived illegitimacy, there has been ‘revisionism…accompanied by the 
glorification of war criminals and their return to public office’. More generally, the survey 
concluded, ‘the people in the former Yugoslavia are in fact further away from each other than 
ever’.52 This is not to suggest that the ICTY completely failed, but rather that if such judicial 
bodies are to have effects beyond just the determination of criminal liability – such as 
reconciliation – they must be seen as legitimate, otherwise the trials will not counter 
50 See, Antonio Cassese, ‘The ICTY: A living and vital reality’, 2, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
(2004), pp. 585-597; Carla Del Ponte, ‘Address by Tribunal Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte to NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly’, The Hague, 26 October 2007, http://www.icty.org/sid/8829, accessed 22 January 2019); Fletcher 
Forum of International Affairs, ‘Interview with Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor of the ICTY’, 24 June, 2013, 
http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2016/9/7/an-interview-with-serge-brammertz-prosecutor-of-the-
international-criminal-tribunal-for-the-former-yugoslavia, accessed 22 January 2019.
51 Marko Milanovic, ‘Understanding the ICTY’s Impact in the Former Yugoslavia’, EJIL Talk, 11 April, 2016, 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/understanding-the-ictys-impact-in-the-former-yugoslavia/, accessed 9 February 2019.
52 Milica Kostić, ‘Public Opinion Survey in Serbia Sheds Light on ICTY Legacy’, EJIL Talk, 22 January, 2018, 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/public-opinion-survey-in-serbia-sheds-light-on-icty-legacy/, accessed 9 February 2019.
nationalistic narratives regarding the attribution of blame and the designation of “heroes” and 
“villains”.53 Indeed, there is a direct precedent from the ICTY which has particular salience 
for the KSC; the ICTY brought cases against former KLA commanders Ramush Haradinaj 
and Fatmir Limaj, charging them with crimes – relating to murder and detention without trial 
– perpetrated against Albanians as well as Serbians. The cases did not, however, negatively 
impact on either’s political career54 as the court’s charges were portrayed within Kosovo as 
illegitimate.
The plight of the KSC is exacerbated by the fact that it is tasked with dealing with an 
especially emotive issue; amongst Kosovo’s majority Albanian population the KLA are 
almost universally regarded as heroes who liberated Kosovo from Serbian oppression. The 
KSC, however, is mandated to uncover and prosecute wilful violence perpetrated by KLA 
soldiers against civilians, including against fellow Albanians. When the KSC was established 
in 2015, the current Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj declared, ‘By approving this court, we 
are turning ourselves into a monster…we were not monsters; we were victims’.55 The 
sensitivities involved in any such proceedings are clearly profound, and thus the probity of 
those making allegations and issuing judgements must be especially high. Given the nature of 
its genesis and composition, it is difficult to imagine how the KSC can issue judgements, 
which by definition run counter to the established national narrative, without incurring 
significant societal backlash; withstanding this backlash in the absence of local legitimacy 
will obviously be extremely difficult.56 
53 There are a number of perspectives on the nature of legitimacy with respects to the ICTY and international 
criminal tribunals more generally; see for example,  Stuart Ford, ‘A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived 
Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
(2012) 45 Vanderbilt J.Transnat'l.L.405; Marko Milanović, ‘The Impact of the ICTY: An Anticipatory Post-
mortem’ (2016) 110(2) AJIL 233, 
54 At the time of writing Haradinaj is the Prime Minister of Kosovo while Limaj is Minister for Trade.
55 Dan Bilefsky, ‘Kosovo Parliament Votes to Allow War Crimes Court’, New York Times, 4 August, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/world/europe/kosovo-parliament-votes-to-allow-war-crimes-
court.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0, accessed 9 February 2019.
56 It must be noted that the crimes being investigated by the KSC would also pose significant problems for a 
purely domestic judicial body. While a national court would automatically have significantly more legitimacy 
The fact that the KSC suffers from a lack of legitimacy amongst the public in Kosovo 
thus poses a considerable obstacle to the achievement of the broader societal positives it was 
claimed it would produce. The paradox is, however, that the KSC only exists because 
external actors wanted it to be established; thus, from its inception it has lacked local 
legitimacy yet it was heralded as a means to achieve ends that are in fact dependent upon 
local legitimacy. It is important to remember, however, that the KSC is a court. In this sense 
it has a very specific mandate, namely to determine the guilt or innocence of those alleged to 
have perpetrated crimes under its remit. It is not, therefore, a body designed to foster 
reconciliation or precipitate a new societal disposition; these are goals others have claimed 
the KSC will achieve, but in itself the KSC has no constitutional duty to do so. If the KSC 
does its specific job competently and the broader transformative goals heralded by others are 
not achieved then this cannot reasonably be cited as evidence of a failure by the KSC itself. 
The Efficacy of the “Internationals”
As noted earlier, the KSC’s location and the nationality of its personnel, derives from a belief 
that these international features of the court are preferable to a traditional national judicial 
process; specifically, that the KSC will be able to avoid the corruption and witness 
intimidation that an exclusively national judicial process would inevitable be prey to.57 Yet, 
than the KSC, this would be no guarantee that its rulings against former KLA fighters would not cause a societal 
backlash. It would, therefore, be wholly unreasonable to imagine that these sensitive cases could be dealt with 
by any court without leading to social unrest; yet, the composition/location of the KSC and – crucially – its lack 
of local legitimacy, accentuates this possibility and its likely severity. 
57 This basic idea – that international criminal tribunals by definition work better than national courts – has been 
a feature of a number of previously established judicial bodies, and the normative assumptions have been 
critiqued; see, Christine Schwobel Patel (ed) (2014) Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law 
(London: Routledge); Christine Schwobel Patel (2018) ‘The Rule of Law as Marketing Tool: The International 
Criminal Court and the Brand of Global Justice’, in Christopher May and Adam Winchester (eds), Research 
Handbook on the Rule of Law (Cheltenham; Edward Elgar) 
the record of international judicial bodies tasked with investigating criminality committed 
within Kosovo does not readily support this view. 
Three international judicial bodies have exercised jurisdiction – to varying degrees 
and with different remits – over Kosovo in relation to the wars of the 1990s; the ICTY, the 
UNMIK courts and EULEX. It is beyond the scope of this article to present a detailed 
evaluation of each; nonetheless, it is clear that the problems that would ostensibly have 
conspired to limit the efficacy of a national judicial process designed to investigate alleged 
KLA criminality – namely witness intimidation, political interference and corruption – have 
in fact also characterised these previous international courts. 
In terms of witness intimidation, a number of ICTY trials dealing with the activities of 
the KLA were notably blighted by prosecution witnesses changing their testimony, 
disappearing or dying in mysterious circumstances prior to, or during, their testimony.58 Both 
the UNMIK courts and EULEX were likewise ‘plagued by problems of intimidation’59 and 
thus witness intimidation is clearly not a phenomenon that uniquely affects Kosovo’s 
domestic judicial bodies. 
With respects to political interference and corruption, many have long alleged that the 
ICTY was, at various times, pushed to issue indictments or ignore certain cases, by powerful 
– invariably Western – actors seeking to pursue particular agendas. These allegations have 
been roundly rejected by ICTY officials, of course, and are difficult to prove; of particular 
relevance to the KSC, however, were allegations made regarding political interference in the 
trials of former KLA leaders; former Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal 
58 Carla del Ponte, Madame Prosecutor (New York: Other Press, 2008), pp. 286-7; International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ‘Press release: Haradinaj, Balaj, and Brahimaj Acquitted on Retrial’, 29 
November, 2012, http://www.icty.org/en/press/haradinaj-balaj-and-brahimaj-acquitted-retrial, accessed 9 
February 2019.; Marija Ristic, ‘Can the New Kosovo Court Keep Witnesses Safe?’, Balkan Transitional Justice, 
20 January, 2016, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/can-the-new-kosovo-court-keep-witnesses-safe--01-
20-2016, accessed 1 June 2019.
59 Serbeze Haxhiaj, ‘Hiding in Plain Sight’, Balkan Transitional Justice, 14 February, 2017, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hiding-in-plain-sight-kosovo-s-protected-witnesses-02-13-2017, 
accessed 9 February 2019.
for the former Yugoslavia Carla del Ponte alleged that the ICTY was discouraged by key 
figures within both the US government and UNMIK from pursuing cases against Kosovo 
Albanians with the same diligence as cases against other nationalities.60 She alleged that 
crimes committed by the KLA were not pursued as vigorously as others because the Western 
narrative regarding Kosovo portrayed the Albanians exclusively as victims of Serbian 
aggression; trials of KLA operatives would naturally compromise this narrative. 
In the case of UNMIK and EULEX, both have been widely criticised for their alleged 
incompetence61 and corruption.62 Neither organisation won the trust of the people in Kosovo 
owing largely to their involvement in a number of scandals, and the perception that their staff 
were self-serving and/or corrupt.63 In November 2017 Malcolm Simmons, President of 
Judges for EULEX, resigned claiming that the organisation was ‘political’ and alleging that 
he had been dissuaded from pursuing certain high profile figures in Kosovo by others in 
EULEX.64 A number of cases relating to events which took place during the period under the 
KSC’s purview, taken on by UNMIK and EULEX ultimately faltered. This was due to a 
combination of factors including witness intimidation but also internal mismanagement of the 
cases.65 
Thus, the KSC is clearly not the first judicial body with an international dimension to 
investigate criminality allegedly perpetrated by the KLA; the idea that it will – by virtue of its 
60 Carla del Ponte, Madame Prosecutor, pp. 280-1.
61 Natalia Żaba, ‘Top EU ‘Judge’ Lacked Credentials to Serve on Kosovo’s Bench’, Coalition on 
Whistleblower Protection, 16 November, 2017, https://see-whistleblowing.org/out-of-order-high-ranking-
eu-judge-lacked-credentials-to-serve-on-kosovos-bench/, accessed 9 February 2019.
62 Krenar Gashi, ‘War Crimes and Eulex’s Broken Kettle’, Balkan Insight, 21 March, 2014, 
https://balkaninsight.com/2014/03/21/war-crimes-and-eulex-s-broken-kettle/, accessed 9 February 2019.
63 Valeria Hopkins, ‘EU Court Trouble with Kosovo Scandal’, Politico, 17 November, 2017, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/malcolm-simmons-eulex-eu-courts-chaos-with-kosovo-scandal/, accessed 9 
February 2019.
64 Par Jean-Baptiste Chastand et Hugo Lemonier ‘Eulex, une mission qui enchaîne les scandales’, Le Monde, 
16 November, 2017, https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/11/16/eulex-une-mission-qui-enchaine-les-
scandales_5215658_3214.html, accessed 9 February 2019.
65 Fatos Bytyci, ‘EU Justice Mission Leaves Kosovo Accused of Failing its Mandate’, Reuters, 14 June, 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-eu-justice/eu-justice-mission-leaves-kosovo-accused-of-failing-its-
mandate-idUSKBN1JA1WH, accessed 9 February 2019; Ristic, ‘Can the New Kosovo Court Keep Witnesses 
Safe?’.
composition and location – operate seamlessly according to the highest international 
standards may be a worthy aim, but the record of previous bodies in Kosovo does not support 
this view. Reflecting on the normative claims made by the KSC as to its efficacy, a EULEX 
prosecutor remarked; ‘If we couldn’t prevent witness intimidation, with all the international 
support we had, I don’t understand how people think the special court will be able to’.66 
Clearly, it cannot be assumed that because UNMIK and EULEX didn’t work as well as they 
claimed they would, the KSC will suffer a similar fate; yet, UNMIK and EULEX’s record 
shows that it also cannot be assumed that international organisations – and the staff therein – 
will be immune to the very issues that undoubtedly afflict Kosovo’s domestic judicial 
system.67 
Internationals not Implicated in Events
A final point regarding the composition of the court relates to the underlying assumption that 
internationals are not culpable for the problems in Kosovo they are tasked with solving. By 
definition, the nature of the court, and the rhetoric of those international actors who pushed 
for its establishment, presents the international realm – and the actors therein – as neutral and 
innocent of any involvement in the crimes under investigation. Central to the narrative 
underpinning the arguments in favour of the court’s creation, was the claim that what certain 
KLA operatives did in Kosovo between 1998 and the end of 2000 was unacceptable and 
66 Interview between author and EULEX Special Prosecutor (on condition of anonymity), Pristina, 20 July, 
2017.
67 It must be noted that the KSC has put in place a range of measures specifically orientated towards ensuring 
witness protection, including the location of the court and its international staff. The KSC has also created a 
‘Witness Protection and Support Office’ within the Registry. The importance of the issue has also been 
repeatedly affirmed by senior KSC officials; see, Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutors Office, 
‘Press Conference of Dr Donlon’, 15 September, 2015, https://www.scp-ks.org/en/press-conference-dr-donlon-
registrar-specialist-chambers, accessed 1 June 2019; Centrum pro lidska prave a demokratizaci, ‘Interview with 
the President of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague, Ekaterina Trendafilova: The Court is Ready for 
its First Indictments’.
could not be allowed to go unpunished. Yet, the nature of what happened in Kosovo after 
NATO’s intervention complicates this seemingly simple presumption. 
Prior to NATO’s intervention the KLA were known to engage in attacks against 
Serbian – and also Albanian – civilians; indeed, in February 1998 the US Envoy to the 
Balkan stated, ‘The UCK (KLA) is without any question a terrorist organisation’68 and a 
month later UN Security Council Resolution 1160 condemned ‘all acts of terrorism by the 
Kosovo Liberation Army’.69 Yet, evidence now suggests that a number of Western states 
covertly sent Special Forces into Kosovo in 1998 to train the KLA.70 More overtly, during 
Operation Allied Force NATO coordinated their military strategy with the organisation.71
After Security Council Resolution 1244 was passed on 10 June 1999 UNMIK assumed 
formal governance powers in Kosovo; thus, for over half of the three year period under the 
KSC’s remit, it was UNMIK who had responsibility both for governing Kosovo, and – along 
with NATO-led KFOR – maintaining peace and security there. UNMIK’s mandate as per 
Resolution 1244 included the responsibilities, ‘Maintaining civil law and order’, and 
‘Protecting and promoting human rights’.72 KFOR, likewise, was established, ‘to take all 
necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo’.73 
Yet, it was precisely during the post-intervention period that the vast majority of 
crimes committed by KLA operatives against Serbs – and “moderate” Albanians – in Kosovo 
were perpetrated. A 2000 report by Amnesty International noted, ‘Since the deployment of 
68  Larry Craig, ‘The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton Policy Support Group with Terror, Drug Ties?’, 
United State Senate Republican Policy Committee, 31 March, 1999,  
http://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/fr033199.htm, accessed 9 February 2019.
69 UN Security Council Resolution 1160, 31 March, 1998, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/090/23/PDF/N9809023.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 9 February 2019.
70 James Pettifer, The Kosova Liberation Army (Hurst & Co.: London, 2012), p. 178.
71 Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit 
Trafficking of Human Organs in Kosovo’, p. 3.
72 UNMIK, ‘About UNMIK: UN Security Council Resolution 1244’, 
http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/1244.aspx, accessed 9 February 2019.
73 ‘Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the Governments of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia’, 9 June, 1999, 
file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/mta.pdf, accessed 9 February 2019.
UNMIK and KFOR, serious crimes and human rights abuses have continued to be 
perpetrated at a disturbing rate in Kosovo’, and observed there was, ‘a climate in which some 
people in Kosovo believe that they may commit crimes and abuse the human rights of others 
with impunity’.74 In a 2001 report, Human Rights Watch noted that by the end of 2000, some 
210,000 Serbs had ‘fled’ Kosovo with most of them leaving, ‘in the first six weeks of the 
NATO deployment’. Additionally, they note that between the 12 June and the end of 2000, 
1,000 Serbs and Roma had been murdered or gone missing.75
These crimes were well documented at the time by media outlets and various 
international organisations on the ground in Kosovo including, Human Rights Watch76, 
Amnesty International77, the International Crisis Group78 and the OSCE.79 By October 1999 
over 200,000 Serbs and thousands of Roma had fled Kosovo in what was then described by 
Carla Del Ponte as, ‘...as serious as what happened there before [NATO’s intervention]’.80 
This exodus, coupled with the widespread criminal acts perpetrated against minorities in 
Kosovo, was perpetrated in full view of UNMIK and KFOR who were mandated to maintain 
peace; in this sense, these organisations evidently failed in their constitutional duty to protect 
minorities and indeed Albanians targeted by the KLA. Human Rights Watch alleged, ‘NATO 
was largely preoccupied with protecting its own troops rather than defending civilians’.81 A 
74 Amnesty International, ‘FRY (Kosovo): Setting the Standard UNIMK and KFOR’s Response to Violence in 
Mitrovica’, pp. 3-4.
75 Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 2001, 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/kosovo/, p. 14
76  Human Rights Watch, ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the New 
Kosovo’, August 1999, Volume 11, No. 10 (D), http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kosov2/, accessed 9 February 
2019.
77 Amnesty International, ‘FRY (Kosovo): Setting the Standard UNMIK and KFOR’S Response to Violence in 
Mitrovica’.
78 International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo Report Card’, Balkan Report 100, 28 August 2000, 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/100-kosovo-report-card.pdf, accessed 4 June 2019.
79 OSCE, ‘Overview of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo’, 3 November 1999, 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13309?download=true, p. 1, accessed 9 February 2019.
80 Quoted in Gordon Bardos, ‘International Policy in Southeast Europe’, in Raju Thomas (ed), Yugoslavia 
Unravelled (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2003), p. 150.
81 Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, p. 15; see also, Brocades Zaalberg, Soldiers 
and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Peace Operation During the 1990s 
(Amsterdam: In Eigen Beheer, 2005), p. 370-2
report by the International Commission on the Balkans noted succinctly, ‘[in Kosovo] the 
international community has clearly failed in its attempts to provide security’.82 
The charge that the international community “failed” to stop the violence perpetrated 
while they were in authority in Kosovo is in itself damning; yet there is additionally evidence 
that the criminality was in fact tolerated and at times facilitated – albeit unofficially – by the 
international authorities. When NATO’s military operations ended, Kosovo was, many 
maintain, subjected to “state capture” by a criminal elite from within the KLA who seized 
control as Serbian troops and administrative officials pulled out.83 The criminal elite 
immediately engaged in corruption, nepotism and the large-scale embezzlement of public 
funds, as well as violence against minorities, and those Albanians opposed to their methods 
and ideology. 
The emergence of this group, however, was not robustly challenged by the international 
administration which then governed Kosovo. An UNMIK official based in Kosovo at the 
time noted that they had a choice; tackle the KLA or strike a deal with them. The latter option 
was chosen because ‘No country was ready to fight the UÇK after having fought against the 
Serbs. No one!’84 Human Rights Watch likewise alleges that in its initial phase, UNMIK and 
KFOR made two fateful decisions; to tolerate the mass exodus of Serbs and to ignore the 
criminality perpetrated by sections of the former KLA.85 According to a report produced on 
behalf of the Council of Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, the 
international administration chose to, ‘turn a blind eye to the war crimes of the KLA’, as they 
82 International Commission on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe’s Future, pgs. 19 & 20.
83 See, Katarina Tadic, ‘State-building and Patronage Networks: how political parties embezzled the 
bureaucracy in post-war Kosovo’, 18(2), Journal Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2018, pp. 185-
202; Gezim Visoka  ‘Three levels of Hybridisation Practices in post-conflict Kosovo’, 7(2), Peacebuilding and 
Development, (2012), 23-36; Andrea Lorenzo Capussela, State-building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and 
the EU in the Balkans (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), p. xiv.
84 Nathalie Duclos ‘The DDR in Kosovo: The DDR in Kosovo: Collision and Collusion among International 
Administrators and Combatants’, 4(1), Peacebuilding, (2016), p. 44.
85  Human Rights Watch, ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: 
Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the New Kosovo’.
believed these figures would bring order to Kosovo; the international administration thus, 
‘favoured a pragmatic political approach taking the view that they needed to promote short-
term stability at any price’.86 This view is endorsed by Human Rights Watch; dismissing the 
claim that UNMIK and KFOR lacked the capacity to stop the violence against minorities, 
they alleged the real reason was ‘the lack of political will’ noting, 
Senior NATO and U. N. officials know that persons linked to the former KLA, 
including some of Kosovo’s key political figures, are implicated in violence 
against minorities and in criminal activities, but they have chosen not to confront 
them.87 
 
Del Ponte likewise alleged that UNMIK officials were particularly keen to cultivate good 
relations with the newly dominant criminal elite that emerged from within the KLA’s ranks; 
UNMIK officials, she claims, came to, ‘deceive themselves into believing that they could rely 
upon former KLA leaders with dubious backgrounds to help develop functioning institutions 
and the rule of law’.88  
There was some logic to this of course; any attempt by UNMIK or KFOR to tackle 
the criminal elements within the KLA immediately after their deployment to Kosovo, would 
have led to confrontations with an armed guerrilla organisation whose support they certainly 
needed; indeed, this fear was not unfounded as, ‘members of the UÇK (KLA) threatened to 
destabilise the peace mission’.89 Additionally, the Serb’s exodus was, in purely order-
orientated strategic terms, not unwelcome; the continued presence of small Serbian 
communities in isolated villages and in cities with a large Albanian majority – such as 
Pristina, Peja and Prizren – would have constituted a persistent source of instability, whereas 
their relocation and concentration in enclaves such as Northern Mitrovica, Orahovac, and 
86 Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit 
Trafficking of Human Organs in Kosovo’, p. 7 & p. 1.
87 Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, p. 15
88 Carla del Ponte, Madame Prosecutor, p. 280; Del Ponte also noted that the Head of KFOR General Mini 
‘joked about the close relationship between some UNMIK personnel and former KLA leaders’, ibid, p. 284.
89 Nathalie Duclos, ‘The DDR in Kosovo: Collision and Collusion among International Administrators and 
Combatants’, p. 47.
Gračanica removed certain ethnic flash points, and made it easier for them to be protected 
against attack. The lack of robust attempts by UNMIK and KFOR to stop ethnic cleansing 
and secure the presence of Serbs and other minorities scattered across Kosovo emboldened 
those intent on driving out the Serbs.90 Indicatively, the Serbian community in Prizren were 
targeted for weeks by armed gangs after the withdrawal of Serbian troops in June 1999, yet 
neither UNMIK nor KFOR took any substantive action to intercede. Indicatively, German 
KFOR troops issued reports detailing the security situation in Prizren after their deployment; 
the violence directed against the Serb community there was so common it soon became 
effectively routine. A report issued on the 7 July noted, ‘Today was a very quiet day. 
Lootings and burnings of houses are still going on, especially in northern part of Prizren’.91 
Eventually the entire Serbian population of Prizren left; this perversely meant that there was 
no more inter-ethnic tension in the city and “order” was restored. 
The leader of the KLA at the time of NATO’s intervention was Hashim Thaci; feted 
by NATO from 1998 on, Thaci eventually became Prime Minister and is currently Kosovo’s 
President. Thaci, however, has long been accused of being the head of an ‘organized crime 
network’ – active since 1998 – that committed war crimes, intimidated “moderate” 
Albanians, and was involved in human trafficking, the sex trade, and heroin distribution.92 
The Council of Europe’s report alleges that Thaci’s criminal network ‘secured political and 
diplomatic endorsement from the United States and other Western powers’ and was tacitly 
supported and protected by the international administration established after NATO’s 
intervention.93
90 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report, p. 109.
91 Brocades Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Peace 
Operation During the 1990s, p. 350
92 Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit 
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93 Ibid, p. 14.
Thus, the criminal activity and oppression perpetrated by Albanians in Kosovo 
between 1998 and 2000 cannot reasonably be portrayed as exclusively the fault of locals; 
while there is little evidence that either UNMIK or KFOR actively participated in the crimes 
under investigation by the KSC, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that they cannot claim 
to be uninvolved, or at least culpable for a dereliction of duty. The international 
administration which assumed formal governance competencies over Kosovo as per 
Resolution 1244 was certainly unprepared for the scale of the task facing them; the lack of a 
functioning judicial system, police force and penal facilities clearly undermined the efficacy 
of both UNMIK and KFOR in fulfilling their mandate.94 Yet, as many reports note, this issue 
of capacity was not the sole reason for the widespread violence; UNMIK and KFOR both 
chose to wilfully ignore the criminality perpetrated by former KLA combatants and routinely 
chose not to prosecute or detain perpetrators.95 Illustratively, Human Rights Watch noted, 
‘Senior NATO and UN officials are well aware that persons linked to the former KLA…are 
implicated in violence against minorities, and in criminal activities, but have chosen to do 
little about it’.96 
The myriad reports criticising UNMIK and KFOR for their behaviour upon assuming 
governance competencies in Kosovo in the wake of Resolution 1244, go far beyond just 
lamenting a lack of preparedness or capacity; while this was undeniably a reality – one which 
in itself constitutes a major failing – the more serious charge is that these organisations 
lacked the will to stop the violence. Yet, these charges do not go so far as to allege that 
UNMIK and KFOR actively colluded with those orchestrating the expulsions and violence; in 
this respect, there is a difference between the dereliction of duty evidenced in Kosovo and the 
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active participation of Dutch Peacekeeping troops in the Srebrenica massacre in 1995.97 
Nonetheless, while these critiques of UNMIK and KFOR do not allege active participation in 
the ethnic cleansing and violence, they are of a sufficient gravity – especially as both 
organisations occupied positions of formal legal authority in Kosovo – to at the very least 
warrant that the activities of the internationals form part of the KSC’s investigations. Yet, 
those states who participated in the military intervention, and were the largest contributors to 
UNMIK and NATO, are the same states who most forcefully pushed for the establishment of 
the KSC through the articulation of a narrative that very clearly frames them as uninvolved 
honest brokers. Of course, formally the KSC has no direct links with UNMIK or KFOR – 
though only one of the KSC’s 18 judges is not from an EU/NATO member state98  – yet, it is 
at the very least paradoxical, that those states who have presented themselves as disinterested 
actors impelled by benevolent motives to redress crimes committed in Kosovo, are in fact 
implicated in the commission of these very crimes.99 
Conclusion
A cursory examination of Balkan history illustrates the extent to which the region has been 
buffeted by the actions of outside powers. Much of the unrest that has erupted there has been 
a consequence of policies and events impelled by external actors, rather than purely the result 
of local shortcomings. Despite this, perceptions of the region continue to orientate around the 
view that the people there are constitutionally incapable of peaceful co-existence and 
97 The participation took the form of, ‘facilitating, in July 1995, the separation of male Bosnian Muslim refugees 
by the Bosnian Serbs in a mini safe area created close to Srebrenica, as well as…evacuating the male refugees 
from the compound of the Dutch UN battalion (Dutchbat)’. Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Peacekeepers Facilitating Human 
Rights Violations’, Netherlands International Law Review, 64, 2017, pp. 453-535; See also, André 
Nollkaemper, ‘Dual Attribution: Liability of the Netherlands for Conduct of Dutchbat in Srebrenica’, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 9(5) 2011, pp. 1143-1157
98 Judge Guénaël Mettraux is from Switzerland.
99 It must be acknowledged that while the KSC is highly unlikely to put a UNMIK/NATO operative on trial, it is 
of course possible that in the course of the KSC’s proceedings, testimonies may well bring to light 
UNMIK/NATO’s failings during the period under consideration. 
dependent on external intervention to save themselves from perennial strife. As Mark 
Mazower notes, while this view has long guided external agents,  
…a truer and less jaundiced understanding of the Balkans requires us to try to unravel 
the ways in which attitudes in the region have been shaped not only by events which 
took place there but by more sweeping narratives of the development of European 
identity and civilisation.100 
Adherents to this “jaundiced understanding” are naturally inclined to both dismiss local 
agency and venerate the capacity of external actors. 
It is precisely this binary between local/bad and international/good which has, I 
argued above, led to the composition of the KSC. This finding is not, however, merely a 
means by which we can retrospectively explain the genesis of the KSC; it has significant 
implications for the court’s future efficacy. Given the sensitivities involved in these cases, it 
is essential that proceedings are seen as legitimate by the people of Kosovo if they are to have 
a positive impact on inter-community relations, yet the origins of the court and its 
composition mitigate against this. Likewise, if genuine justice is to be achieved for those 
victims of the violence perpetrated by the KLA, then investigations must be conducted 
without underlying normative assumptions about international innocence; ignoring the 
international community’s involvement in the events under the KSC’s jurisdiction, and the 
failure of various international judicial bodies to previously deal with these issues, can only 
negatively impact on any attempt to accurately determine liability for the injustice suffered 
by victims since 1999. 
100 Mazower, The Balkans, pp. 14-15.
